Normative

Let us take the word ‘duty’ for the moment. Conflict in duties does not give you a moral dilemma. For a moral dilemma to occur two necessary conditions must exist: the prescribed set of duties must be logically consistent by virtue of which one is obliged to perform them all. A dilemma pertains to a situation where one has an obligation to do A and an obligation to do B; but can in fact do only …

I want to respond to three of your points Claus. First you are not talking only about the Greeks and the Romans because all the problems arising with respect to the phenomena of non-Western societies and culture are/were equally the problems in the frameworks of different varieties of culture. You not only talk about the Greeks and the Romans, you gave examples about the French and the English as …

It is advisable to get into a discussion about this question only after one knows what ‘supererogation’ means and how it has been discussed for centuries. In the Greek ethics (especially as Aristotle formulated it), the notion plays a very crucial role without it being related to a normative sense of duty. With the Catholics, especially as Aquinas gave expression to it, a normative notion of duty …

When you provide a moral criticism of someone, you are saying that such a person is morally wrong. If you bracket, for a moment, my writings and talks on the subject, then you see that no moral criticisms are possible without using a normative language. About realizing moral ideals: do you know any way of showing how some or another event in the world is not an ‘imperfect’ realization of the …

This one begins to reflect about the principle of charity in relationship to the current US President, Donald Trump (from now on, Trump). As you might know, the principle of charity has been formulated in different ways by different people. (Even the first page of a google search of the word ‘principle of charity’ allows you to access many of these documents quickly.) This post will stick strictly …

First: there is nothing morally wrong in posting an opinion. My problem is that (a) it occurs within the context of generating and criticising knowledge; (b) its cognitive value is either zero or negative; (c) it is presented as though thoughtless opinions (almost all opinions are thoughtless) form a counterpoint to knowledge or are themselves candidates for knowledge (the latter are the …

Increasingly, the phenomenon of terrorism has begun to occupy the media, politics, and the lives of people in different parts of the world. The more the attention, however, the less the clarity: what kind of a phenomenon is terrorism? What generates it, what sustains it, and what allows it to expand on an ever-increasing scale? This lack of clarity has to do with the fact that our ideas about …

There is ethics in India, but it is not normative ethics. It is a non-normative ethics. To get you going, consider acts like ‘generosity’, ‘kindness’, ‘bravery’, ‘friendliness’ and such like. Often called ‘virtues’, these actions do not come under the scope of normative ethics. You cannot say: “one ought to be generous”, because generosity implies doing ‘more than’ what is expected in the act of …

Here is what I say in my article on ‘how to speak for the Indian traditions’: “Our middle-aged man is, thus, raising the question of Aristotle.“I have pursued many things in life. I have acquired wealth and status, and aimed with varying degrees of success to become powerful and famous. I have been successful in some of my endeavors, while failing in yet others. I thought these things would make …

In “An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals”, David Hume, the philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, raises a question, which has always been one of the basic concerns of ethical investigations in the modern western intellectual tradition: what theory of morals could serve any useful purpose, he asks, unless it can be shown that all the duties it recommends are also in the true …

While translating Russell L. Ackoff, you say that such a translation is “not a moral judgment now, but a statement about the state of the economy”. But your claim, according to Ackoff’s own argument, is untrue. Consider how he describes corruption: “We concluded that corruption occurs when one party, A (for example, a policeman), who has an obligation to a second party, B (for example, the …

I was invited by some Sadhus from Swami Narayan Temple (BAPS) to visit the temple and have a discussion with them. Because they practice very strict Brahmacharya (eight types of avoiding women, each correlated to an organ: it is called Ashtanga Brahmacharya), the Sadhus said that women could not be present during our discussions, while they were welcome to visit the temple. As I remember the …

Vyasa’s argument (to the extent we can speak of an argument in this context) is quite subtle: When Urvasi comes to Arjuna at the behest of his father, and when she is possessed by desire, and when the Apsaras choose freely and unconfined, then (a) one cannot reject her; (b) and with the argument that she is a superior to him. If you split this conjunction and cast in normative terms, it says …

You suggest that calling Apsaras as “prostitutes in the court of Indra” is an extreme statement. Of course, you would be right if you mean that the English word does not carry all the connotations of ‘Veshya’ or even that our current usage of the word ‘Veshya’ is not as rich as the earlier uses of the same word were. You are right too when you point out that the word ‘Kama’, as a pursushartha, …

1.1. The Indian traditions did not have the same attitude as Christianity towards prostitution or adultery. And the Indians of yesteryears were not defenders of the Victorian (and Christian) morality. Of course, I approvingly said that the “Indians are not prudes” but this approval has to do with the thrust of Indian thought, as I have understood it: the impossibility of prohibiting or making …

Traditions are inherited practices, which mean two things: they are both transmitted and learnt. The learning occurs through imitation, following instructions, through stories and so on. Consequently, traditions ‘change’ (i.e. undergo modifications) even as they are being transmitted and learnt. This makes traditions flexible and adaptive. Human practices conserve, that is, we do not go around …

Assume that India (or any other society) does not have an ethics. What would happen? Surely, if ethics has something to do with coordinating human actions, we know of several ways to do the same without taking recourse to ethical thinking: laws, rules (like those in games), agreements, pacts, covenants, … are some of the candidates. Assume that India does not know of normative ethics. So, what is …

There are other normative statements besides ethical ones: even aesthetic statements are normative (when you judge something to be ugly or beautiful) or statements about the presence of other values (say, ’the meaning of life’ questions). I have never denied it. As you rightly point out, legal norms are normative but they are not co-extensive with the ethical ones. If there are standards to …

We need to tackle the following issues properly if we want to get a handle on normativity and its relation to a configuration of learning. 1.1. Normativity cannot be the product of ethical learning. If it were that, say, by being a biological inheritance, then normative thinking would be the form of all ethics and my claim is that it is not so. 1.2. Nevertheless, we need to explain the success of …

I still have some difficulty in figuring out the problem about normative ethics expressed on the Abhinavagupta forum. There is obviously something that bugs people, but I cannot make out what it is. First, about the counter evidence. If the Indian film censor board is a statutory body, then it derives its powers from the laws that have brought such an entity into being. Its tasks (viz. whether it …